Licensing Negotiation Groups under the Commission’s Draft Technology Transfer Guidelines: Implications for Standard Essential Patent Licensing
By Tuulia Ferm, LL.M.[1]
Introduction
Advanced technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly embedded across almost every sector of the economy. Examples include safety, health, transportation, security, agriculture, energy, infrastructure and manufacturing. These technologies rely heavily on connectivity standards such as 5G, which incorporate patented technologies. As a result, the licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs) becomes relevant in sectors beyond traditional telecommunications.[2] Fostering an effective and predictable licensing environment ensures both investments in developing cutting-edge standardised technologies and enables their broad adoption. This, in turn, benefits consumers, industry and society at large.
In September 2025, the European Commission published draft versions of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER)[3] and the accompanying Technology Transfer Guidelines (draft Guidelines)[4]. In this context, the draft Guidelines introduced guidance on a novel type of collective licensing arrangement, referred to as ‘licensing negotiation groups’ (LNGs). In short, LNGs are arrangements whereby a group of technology implementers collectively negotiate licensing terms with patent owners. LNGs were presented as a means of reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries, potentially leading to licensing efficiencies. To date, however, they remain largely theoretical, as there is no noteworthy practical experience with such arrangements operating in real life.[5]
The draft Guidelines established a ‘soft safe harbour’ for LNGs without any robust and reliable market experience on LNGs. While such safe harbour is subject to certain conditions, the Commission explicitly recognised the severe potential anticompetitive risks attached to such arrangements.[6]
This paper provides a competition law assessment of LNGs grounded in the practical realities of SEP licensing. It identifies aspects suggesting that the proposed guidance on LNGs is not aligned with the existing framework of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The paper argues that the draft Guidelines do not adequately reflect the economic and structural realities of SEP licensing and risk harming the very competitiveness they seek to promote.
[1] Tuulia Ferm, LL.M., is IPR Policy Researcher at Ericsson. All views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Ericsson or its affiliates. All links were accessed on 20 March 2026.
[2] See European Commission, Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents, COM(2017) 712 final, 1.
[3] These instruments govern the assessment of technology transfer agreements under EU competition law, in particular Article 101 TFEU; see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. The TTBER grants a block exemption for certain technology transfer agreements under Article 101 TFEU, on the presumption that agreements meeting its conditions satisfy Article 101(3). The Guidelines clarify the interpretation of the TTBER and explain how agreements falling outside the block exemption are assessed under EU competition law.
[4] European Commission, Communication on draft TTBER and Technology Transfer Guidelines, OJ C 5024, 16 September 2025,
[5] In July 2025, the Commission issued guidance on an automotive LNG (ALNG), noting that LNGs represent a new type of arrangement and that, to its knowledge, no LNGs currently operate in the EU; see European Commission, Case AT.40979, Guidance – Automotive LNG, C(2025), 4526 final, paras 27–28. See also Commission, Press Release IP/25/1768 (9 July 2025).
[6] European Commission, Draft Technology Transfer Guidelines, para 326.
